Overcoming Diminished Motivation by Morciglio, Jumana
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Philosophy Theses Department of Philosophy
8-12-2016
Overcoming Diminished Motivation
Jumana Morciglio
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please
contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Morciglio, Jumana, "Overcoming Diminished Motivation." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2016.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/200
OVERCOMING DIMINISHED MOTIVATION 
 
by 
 
JUMANA MORCIGLIO 
 
Under the Direction of Andrea Scarantino 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Self-control is required when an agent encounters some opposition to acting on her better 
judgments. One such opposition is diminished motivation, that is, a lack of desire to act on a 
better judgment. Thomas Connor compares two views of successful self-control, actional (i.e. the 
view that self-control is produced by a motivated action) and non-actional (i.e. the view that self-
control consists of having unmotivated thoughts), and argues that non-actional views are better at 
explaining successful self-control in cases of diminished motivation. I reject Connor’s suggestion 
that successful self-control is likely to be non-actional by presenting two arguments: (1) non-
actional views do not possess an advantage in explaining successful self-control because of a 
failure to provide an account of how self-controlling thoughts arise when self-control is required, 
and (2) actional views can account for successful self-control in the case of diminished 
motivation, namely, by prescribing minimally taxing strategies of self-control. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
In the face of temptation, people attempt to utilize self-control in order to stick to their 
better judgments; an instance of self-control is marked by successfully acting on those better 
judgments. There are two types of self-control: diachronic and synchronic. Diachronic self-
control occurs when one acts on one’s better judgment in the absence of motivational opposition 
created by some recalcitrant desire. When an agent decides to go on a diet, for instance, she can 
throw away all the junk food in her home in order to prevent potential future temptations to 
break from her diet. Synchronic self-control, on the other hand, occurs when one acts on one’s 
better judgment in the presence of motivational opposition created by some recalcitrant desire. A 
dieting agent, for example, can distract herself from a tempting slice of chocolate cake that is 
sitting right in front of her in order to prevent the present temptation to break from her diet. The 
difficulty in explaining how an agent can be synchronically self-controlled is finding a way to 
reconcile how a self-controlled agent can act on her better judgment despite a stronger 
motivation to indulge in some temptation (i.e., how she can manage to do what she is less 
motivated to do). 
 
1.1  Background on the Debate 
There are two types of views that explain how successful synchronic self-control is 
possible in temptation cases: actional and non-actional. Actional views of self-control explain 
that successful self-control is the product of an active pursuit (i.e. an intentional and motivated 
action) to stick to one’s better judgments; if a dieting agent, for example, is faced with a slice of 
tempting chocolate cake, she can perform certain intentional actions to avoid this temptation, 
such as throwing away the slice of cake or distracting herself with thoughts about something 
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other than eating. Non-actional views, on the other hand, describe successful self-control as the 
product of a passive response (i.e. unmotivated thoughts that influence action) that helps one 
stick to one’s better judgments; returning to the example of the dieting agent, her encounter with 
the cake can trigger the right sorts of thoughts that work to reduce the temptation that the cake is 
causing, such as thinking about herself as overweight or sick from too much sugar. 
The self-control literature is primarily focused on temptation cases, that is, cases which 
involve some sort of recalcitrant desire that opposes one’s better judgment. Another type of 
situation that requires self-control, according to Thomas D. Connor (2014), is when an agent 
experiences diminished motivation, that is, an attenuated desire to pursue her goals (786).1 One 
can, for instance, believe that it is best for one to accomplish some chore like loading the 
dishwasher, but have no desire to actually go through with loading the dishwasher. In such a 
case, there is no temptation per se that opposes loading the dishwasher, but rather one is simply 
not motivated to complete the task. Successful self-control in the case of diminished motivation 
can occur if there is a significant increase in one’s desire to act according to one’s better 
judgments, such as inspiring sufficient desire in oneself to load the dishwasher. Connor 
compares how the two types of views could account for successful self-control in the case of 
diminished motivation and argues that non-actional views are better at accounting for successful 
self-control in this case than actional views, thus suggesting that all instances of successful self-
control are likely to be non-actional.  
 
                                                 
1 Connor discusses diminished motivation as both a deficit and a complete lack of desire, but I will treat this case as 
involving only a deficit in desire; Connor is willing to grant that diminished motivation isn’t characterized by a 
complete lack of desire and I shall do the same. 
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1.2 Rejecting the Claim that Successful Self-Control is Non-Actional 
I will reject Connor’s suggestion that successful synchronic self-control is likely to be 
non-actional by presenting two arguments: (1) I will argue that non-actional views do not possess 
an advantage in explaining successful self-control because non-actional views have failed to 
provide an account of how self-controlling thoughts arise when self-control is required, and (2) I 
will present a way in which actional views can account for successful self-control in the case of 
diminished motivation, namely, by prescribing minimally taxing strategies of self-control. In 
section 2 of this paper, I will describe the actional and non-actional views, as well as the case of 
diminished motivation and the problem that this case poses for an actional account of successful 
self-control. In section 3, I will propose three potential sources of unmotivated self-controlling 
thoughts and explain how all three potential sources are problematic. In section 4, I propose a 
potential account of successful actional self-control in the case of diminished motivation and 
argue that it is plausible to utilize certain minimally taxing actional strategies, such as cognitive 
reappraisal, in order to overcome diminished motivation because such strategies do not require 
many cognitive resources. 
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2 ACTIONAL SELF-CONTROL, NON-ACTIONAL SELF-CONTROL, AND 
DIMINISHED MOTIVATION 
Thomas Connor points out that the majority of the self-control literature is concerned 
with the classic temptation case (i.e. where self-control is required to overcome a temptation that 
is contrary to one’s better judgment); diminished motivation, however, occurs quite often as 
well, and should thus be included in the self-control debates. Examples of diminished motivation 
can range from more extreme examples, such as severe depression, to more common examples, 
such as apathy or general laziness. Connor compares the capacity of actional and non-actional 
views of self-control to explain successful self-control in the case of diminished motivation and 
argues that non-actional views are better able to account for successful self-control in the case of 
diminished motivation; this conclusion leads Connor to suggest that all instances of successful 
self-control are likely to be non-actional. In this section, I will outline the actional and non-
actional positions, as well the case of diminished motivation and Connor’s argument for why 
non-actional views are better able to account for successful self-control in this case.  
 
2.1 Two Views of Synchronic Self-Control 
The fundamental difference between actional and non-actional views of self-control is 
that the former describes self-control as a motivated action, whereas the latter identifies self-
control as an unmotivated doing. Non-actional views posit that “self-control consists in the 
having of unmotivated thoughts”; this view is endorsed by Jeanette Kennett and Michael Smith 
(1996), who make the distinction between performing an action, which requires that an agent is 
motivated by some goal, and merely doing something, which does not require that an agent is 
motivated in the same way (2014; 784). Kennett and Smith recognize that a doing is often 
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considered an action, but they believe that this consideration is “an over-generalization because 
not all doings are actions” (1996; 69).  For example, Kennett and Smith explain that “thinking 
need not be an action, because the having of thoughts need not be a causal consequence of a 
desire to achieve something and a belief that that can be achieved by having those very thoughts” 
(1996; 68-69 my emphasis). In order to illustrate this point, imagine the dieting agent who is 
being tempted by a slice of chocolate cake and comes to think certain thoughts about the 
negative aspects of the cake. This agent might imagine herself overweight, think about how 
much sugar is in a single slice of cake, recollect the reasons for why she went on a diet, etc. 
These thoughts are unmotivated because the agent has these thoughts without any intention to 
utilize them in order to achieve the goal of staying on one’s diet. 
Actional views maintain that self-control is a motivated action. Conner makes a 
distinction between two types of actional views: holistic and partition views. The latter views 
argue that behavior is the product of two systems, an active cognitive system and a passive 
affective system, but self-control is a function of the active system.2 The former, on the other 
hand, understand self-control as the product of both active and passive processes. Alfred Mele 
(1987; 2012) presents a holistic actional view of self-control, in that “the self of self-control is 
identified with the whole human being rather than with reason” (2012; 92). In other words, self-
control is a product of both active (e.g. rational) and passive (e.g. affective) processes. Mele 
believes that exercising self-control is compatible with experiencing recalcitrant desires that 
oppose one’s better judgment by presenting the example of Ian, who judges that he ought to 
paint the shed but is tempted to remain on the couch watching TV instead. Given that Ian’s 
desire to stay on the couch is stronger than his motivation to paint the shed, Ian needs to exercise 
                                                 
2 For examples of partition views, see Sripada (2012), who presents the “divided mind” view, and Holton (2009), 
who distinguishes between typical motivational processes and willpower.  
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self-control in order to get off the couch and go paint the shed. But how can Ian exercise self-
control to paint the shed if he is more motivated to indulge in the temptation of staying on the 
couch? Mele responds to this question by pointing out that while Ian’s motivation to paint the 
shed might be weaker that his motivation to remain on the couch, it could be the case that Ian’s 
motivation to be self-controlled is stronger than his motivation to remain on the couch. In this 
sense, Ian’s desire to remain on the couch does not preclude Ian’s desire to be self-controlled, but 
rather the “real obstacle to his exercising self-control would be any motivation he has to refrain 
from doing so since he cannot satisfy both of these desires simultaneously (i.e. both exercise and 
refrain from exercising self-control)” (2014; 786). Importantly, if Ian got off the couch to paint 
the shed because he was motivated to be self-controlled, Ian would be exercising self-control in 
the actional sense.  
 
2.2      Successful Self-Control in the Case of Diminished Motivation 
In temptation cases (i.e. when an agent’s better judgment is opposed by some contrary 
temptation, as in the shed and couch case), the motivation to act on one’s better judgment is 
weak relative to the motivation to indulge in temptation. Diminished motivation, however, is 
characterized by a lack of motivation in general, that is, “the agent in these cases seems not to 
sufficiently case about pursuing his or her goals” to varying degrees (2014; 786). Diminished 
motivation can thus be understood as a deficit in the desire to accomplish one’s goals. According 
to Connor, the extreme cases of diminished motivation (e.g. severe depression) instantly pose a 
problem for Mele’s actional view of self-control, since “there seems to be nothing to motivate 
actional self-control” when an agent lacks any positive motivation to accomplish her goals. In 
other words, actional self-control requires motivation to be self-controlled but diminished 
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motivation is a case where agents lack motivation; an agent cannot be motivated to be self-
controlled if she lacks motivation in general. In this sense, actional views are unable to account 
for successful self-control in the case of diminished motivation. 
Connor, however, is willing to concede that diminished motivation involves a deficit in 
desire, rather than a complete lack of desire. ADD HERE Even granting that diminished 
motivation is a deficit of motivation, Connor argues that actional views are still unable to 
account for successful self-control in these cases. Even if Ian, for example, has enough 
motivation to exercise self-control in the actional sense,  
he may still experience a failure of self-control in that he finds 
himself taking longer to get off the sofa; or, when he does get up, 
he paints the shed to a substandard degree, putting fewer number 
of coats of paint on, and making a shoddier job of it than he may 
otherwise have done. And this is due to his attempt at self-control 
being itself undermotivated (2014; 791).  
 
The point that Connor emphasizes is that on the actional view, one’s level of motivation 
is positively correlated with the likelihood that one will successfully stick to one’s better 
judgments – the less motivation one has, the less likely it is that one will successfully act on 
one’s better judgments. Given that diminished motivation inherently involves low levels of 
motivation, the likelihood that agents who experience diminished motivation will be successfully 
self-controlled in the actional sense is also low. 
Non-actional views, by understanding self-control as the unmotivated having of thoughts, 
escape this problem that arises for actional views in the case of diminished motivation. Since the 
having of self-controlling thoughts is unmotivated, deficits in motivation will not hinder the 
likelihood of having those thoughts. Non-actional views seem to be readily able to account for 
successful self-control in the case of diminished motivation, whereas actional views encounter a 
challenge in accounting for successful self-control in this case; this leads Connor to conclude that 
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“if synchronic self-control over diminished motivation (in either more or less extreme cases) is 
possible then it is plausibly of the non-actional variety” (2014; 793).  
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3     THE MYSTERIOUS SOURCE OF SUCCESSFUL NON-ACTIONAL SELF-
CONTROL 
The feature that allegedly gives non-actional views the comparative advantage in 
explaining successful self-control in the case of diminished motivation is that non-actional self-
control is unmotivated. Kennett and Smith seem to think that the source of a motivated action is 
a desire and belief set, specifically, the desire to be self-controlled and the belief that performing 
some action will result in self-control, and Connor adopts this model as well. The fundamental 
difference between temptation cases and diminished motivation cases is that the former involves 
an excess of desire (i.e. the desire motivating one’s temptation is too strong), whereas the latter 
involves a deficiency of desire (i.e. the desire motivating one’s better judgment is too weak); the 
challenge for actional views in accounting for successful self-control in the case of diminished 
motivation is thus reconciling the need for desire to motivate the action of self-control and the 
deficiency of desire that agents with diminished motivation experience.  
While denying the need for motivation, or the desire component of motivation in specific 
(i.e. the claim that the desire to be self-controlled is not necessary to produce successful self-
control) appears to allow non-actional views to explain how an agent can be self-controlled when 
she experiences diminished motivation, this move actually makes the origin of non-actional self-
control quite puzzling. The major question that arises when considering how the non-actional 
process of self-control works is the following: if self-controlling thoughts are not caused by a 
desire to be self-controlled, how does one come to have these thoughts? Kennett and Smith have 
stated that self-controlling thoughts are not the consequence of a desire to be self-controlled and 
a belief that having these thoughts will produce self-control, but they have not explicitly 
identified what does make an agent have the right thoughts at the right time in cases of 
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successful self-control. It seems to me that there are at least three ways to interpret the origin of 
self-controlling thoughts on the non-actional view, but all three ways are problematic. 
 
3.1 Self-Controlling Thoughts as an Automatic Reflex 
On the face of it, it seems like Kennett and Smith might be making the implication that 
self-controlling thoughts spontaneously appear at the right time. This general implication arises 
from claiming that a self-controlled agent doesn’t perform any actions, but rather merely has 
certain thoughts. This is the least charitable interpretation of Kennett and Smith’s view, but it is 
worth highlighting the problems with assuming that self-controlling thoughts arise spontaneously 
because doing so will help reveal what a process of self-control ought to be like. 
The problem with assuming that the right self-controlling thoughts spontaneously arise at 
the right time is that self-control becomes a matter of sheer coincidence. If there is no causal 
mechanism responsible for producing self-control, and nothing but mere chance determines 
whether an agent will think the right thoughts, then thinking the right thoughts can hardly be 
called instance of self-control. Instead, the concept of self-control intuitively demands that the 
agent plays some role in having the right sorts of thoughts at the right times. If, for example, a 
dieting agent became distracted from a slice of chocolate cake because someone else distracted 
them by running into the room and starting to scream, then the distraction would not be a matter 
of the agent doing something (even in the minimal sense). Rather, for distraction to count as an 
instance of self-control, it is expected that the distraction is somehow caused by the agent herself 
and not by some external force.3 Thus, for some instance of sticking to one’s better judgment to 
                                                 
3 Emotion regulation literature defines attention deployment (i.e. capacity to shift attention) as a cognitive 
process, but I think it is also possible that non-cognitive processes can contribute to attention deployment. I will 
return to this point in the following section. 
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qualify as self-control, a minimal requirement is that the self, in some sense of the term, is the 
source of the control. 
 
3.2 Recalling the Reasons for One’s Better Judgment 
Another potential origin of self-controlling thoughts that Kennett and Smith might be 
implying is that the right beliefs or thoughts were formed at a previous time and simply recalled 
upon encountering motivational opposition; recalling does not have to be a causal consequence 
of a desire to be self-controlled, but can rather arise as a passive response, thus recalling seems to 
qualify as a cause of self-controlling thoughts on the non-actional view. This interpretation is 
based on Kennett and Smith’s portrayal of self-control as more of a passive response rather than 
an active pursuit; when making the distinction between an action and a doing, Kennett and Smith 
might be implying that self-control is a reflex-like process since a doing, on their view, is 
minimally active. For self-controlling thoughts to be a response to particular stimulus, those 
thoughts are likely to have been primed so that these thoughts can be a reliable response to the 
proper stimuli. It could be the case that these thoughts are formed in the agent’s mind when she 
is deliberating (i.e. considering all relevant factors and potential instances of motivational 
opposition), so when she recalls those thoughts in an instance where motivational opposition is 
present, the agent doesn’t have to actively engage in having those thoughts.4 In other words, 
reflexively recalling is akin to a doing, since the desire to be self-controlled is not the source of 
this recall, whereas intentionally forming thoughts or intentional recalling is an action because it 
requires the motivation that arises from a desire to be self-controlled. Importantly, the agent is 
                                                 
4 It could be argued that recollection is an active process, but the memory system is comprised of both active 
processes (i.e. hippocampal-dependent memory) and passive processes (i.e. the dorsal striatum-dependent 
memory); I will return to this point in the following section. 
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playing a significant role in the production of successful self-control, thus recalling self-
controlling thoughts counts as a form of self-control and is a more charitable proposition for the 
source of these self-controlling thoughts on the non-actional view.  
The problem that arises for this proposed interpretation of how one comes to have self-
controlling thoughts is that such a process has a narrow scope of potential instances of 
motivational opposition that it is primed to respond to and this interpretation doesn’t explain how 
an agent can form beliefs or thoughts that she needs but never has had. On this interpretation of 
how one comes to have the right sorts of thoughts, the non-actional process of self-control can 
produce an instance of successful self-control only in situations in which the agent’s previously 
formed beliefs and thoughts are applicable. What if an agent encounters some opposition but 
none of her current beliefs are applicable to that particular situation? An agent could, for 
example, form the better judgment that she ought to go on a diet to lose weight but lack the 
general belief that ingesting sugar causes as much weight gain as ingesting fats because this 
agent has never made the association between weight gain and excessive sugar intake; in 
encountering sugar filled but fat free treats, this agent is not likely to have the right sorts of 
corresponding thoughts about this sugary fat-free snack because she does not has the right 
general beliefs to apply to her specific situation (i.e. that this particular snack, although fat free, 
still contributes to weight gain). Lacking a preexisting belief about weight gain due to excessive 
intake of sugar will not trigger a corresponding negative response to the sugar-free fatty snack, 
thus this agent is likely to fail to stick to her diet. A process that will likely produce successful 
self-control, however, must be flexible and adaptive enough to allow an agent to form the right 
sorts of beliefs or thoughts in instances where those beliefs or thoughts are needed but be 
passively recollected precisely because they were never formed to begin with. This is especially 
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true for the case of diminished motivation, as opposed to temptation, because the thing that gives 
rise to the opposition is very broad and general, whereas the thing that gives rise to opposition in 
temptation cases is very precise and particular (e.g. a slice of chocolate cake for dieters, a 
cigarette for someone who is attempting to quit smoking, an attractive person for one who is 
struggling with being in a faithful relationship, etc.). In other words, one can typically identify an 
object of temptation, but it is much harder to identify the object of diminished motivation 
precisely because diminished motivation doesn’t involve an object. Without having a specific 
stimulus, the non-actional process will not be able to passively recall the right sorts of thoughts 
or beliefs that will result in successful self-control because there is nothing to trigger the passive 
recollection. Having such a rigid scope of passive responses and having no backup mechanism 
for instances where one lacks the appropriate beliefs or thoughts sets significant limits to the 
potentiality of the non-actional process to produce successful self-control. 
 
3.3 Disposition to be Self-Controlled 
One last possible source for self-controlling thoughts on the non-actional view, as 
elaborated by Connor, is a disposition to have those sorts of thoughts. In presenting an example 
of a smoker who is attempting to quit, Connor proposes to imagine that this smoker “had 
acquired a disposition to think certain self-controlling thoughts – e.g. thoughts about the 
cancerous effects of smoking – precisely when they feel tempted to smoke” (2013; 785, my 
emphasis). Acquiring a disposition to think certain thoughts certainly avoids the problems that 
the first two potential sources of self-controlling thoughts faced, namely, ascribing a significant 
role to the agent (i.e. the agent is the one who possesses the disposition), and self-control being 
an adaptive and flexible process (i.e. dispositions have the capacity to be quite sophisticated 
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response mechanisms); this seems to be the most charitable interpretation of how one comes to 
have self-controlling thoughts on the non-actional view. Importantly, having a disposition to 
think the right sorts of thoughts is a non-actional form of self-control since one’s disposition, 
rather than a desire to be self-controlled, is the source of self-controlling thoughts.  
Despite the virtues of pointing to an acquired disposition as the source of self-controlling 
thoughts, there still remains a problem for explaining successful self-control in this way. 
Specifically, pointing to an acquired disposition doesn’t explain how an agent has the right 
thoughts at the right times. Dispositions can range from being active, such as the disposition to 
be honest, to being passive, such as the disposition to be disgusted by green vegetables. 
Presumably, active dispositions produce more effortful behavior while passive dispositions 
produce less effortful behavior. For example, an honest disposition manifested in a particular 
action, say, telling one’s friend that her new haircut doesn’t look flattering, can be properly 
called an effortful action because it involves an intentional pursuit of a goal, whereas a 
disposition to be disgusted by green vegetables manifested in a gagging reflex when served 
asparagus at a restaurant is essentially effortless because it is an automatic response. Non-
actional self-control must be the product of a more passive disposition rather than an active 
disposition, since having self-controlling thoughts is more analogous to a gagging reflex at the 
sight of asparagus than to intentionally telling one’s friend that she got a bad haircut. Passive 
dispositions, however, are not as sophisticated as active dispositions, in the sense that passive 
dispositions are more likely to respond to inappropriate stimuli. A green light, for examples can 
be shined over white cauliflower, which can trigger one’s passive disposition to be disgusted by 
green vegetables; similarly, one can unknowingly eat an entire bowl of zucchini that was 
shredded to look like pasta without being disgusted. Self-control, however, requires a certain 
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degree of sophistication in responding to the right stimuli because self-control is required in 
complex situations (i.e. a motivational conflict between a better judgment and either a temptation 
or diminished motivation). An effective response must be sensitive to all the various factors there 
are to consider in a given situation, hence, if self-controlling thoughts are the product of a 
disposition, then successful self-control is more likely to be produced by a more active 
disposition. 
 
All three possible sources of self-controlling thoughts that I have presented on behalf of 
the non-actional views face significant problems in accounting for other important features of 
self-control. It is possible that Kennett and Smith have a different answer in mind for how an 
agent comes to have self-controlling thoughts in the non-actional sense – one that is also able to 
account for the agent’s role in being self-controlled, the adaptive flexibility of self-control, as 
well as a mechanism that is able to identify the right actions for the right situations – but they 
have not explicitly provided that answer. If there is nothing that allows an agent to have self-
controlling thoughts, then it seems that it is not possible, let alone likely, that an agent will 
actually have these self-controlling thoughts. Without a clear explanation of how an agent can 
come to have self-controlling thoughts, the non-actional view cannot rely on unmotivated self-
controlling thoughts as a way to overcome diminished motivation. 
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4 OVERCOMING DIMISHED MOTIVATION THROUGH ACTIONAL SELF-
CONTROL 
The general strategy of self-control prescribed by non-actional views (i.e. changing one’s 
perspective on the situation) is a form of reappraisal; reappraisal is a very popular and effective 
emotion regulation strategy (Gross 2013). Reappraisal resulting in successful self-control is 
unmotivated on non-actional views, as opposed to the cognitive (i.e. deliberate and effortful) 
reappraisal discussed in the psychological literature. Actional views can account for successful 
self-control in the case of diminished motivation by pointing to a form of cognitive reappraisal, 
but such an account must explain where the motivation to reappraise comes from. A potential 
explanation that actional views can present is two-fold: (1) reappraisal is a minimally taxing (i.e. 
requires minimal cognitive resources) strategy of self-control, and (2) the feeling of diminished 
motivation signals a deficit, but not necessarily a complete lack, of cognitive resources available 
to the agent. Taken together, these two claims essentially point out that agents who experience 
diminished motivation might still have some, albeit very few, cognitive resources reserved, 
which could be utilized to reappraise the situation and thus provide the opportunity to overcome 
diminished motivation through an actional strategy of self-control. 
 
4.1 Minimally Taxing Cognitive Reappraisal 
There is reason to believe that reappraisal is a minimally taxing strategy of self-control. 
The discussion of effort by Olivier Massin (2014) clarifies how reappraisal could work in a 
situation that requires self-control (i.e. a situation that involves some sort of opposition to acting 
according to one’s better judgments). Moreover, the results of the delay of gratification studies 
conducted by Walter Mischel and Ozlem Ayduk (2004), which test for the capacity to wait for a 
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larger reward while being tempted by a lesser reward, seem to nicely illustrate how effective and 
efficient reappraisal can be when used as a strategy of self-control in temptation cases, but the 
same strategy can be applied to cases of diminished motivation as well. 
In explaining the nature of effort, Massin outlines six essential a priori claims that define 
effort, the last two being especially pertinent to active pursuits to be self-controlled: 5 
5. INTENSITY: efforts have an intensity. Our efforts are more or 
less intense. 
6. OPPOSITION: effort entails the encounter of some obstacle or 
resistance to our attempt. E.g. «Julie makes an effort to swim 
against the tide». We make efforts to φ against something (The 
Nature of Effort, 2014). 
 
Massin explains that the intensity of effort is “plausibly a function of the resistance met. Heavy 
objects require more effort to lift them, hard problems require more effort to solve them. The 
more they resist, the more intense our effort is” (The Nature of Effort, 2014). Actional self-
control utilizes primarily mental effort, and thus requires cognitive resources, specifically when 
an agent experiences some form of mental opposition (e.g. the recalcitrant desire to indulge in 
some temptation). Since self-control involves mental activities, perceptions and mental 
representations will play a significant role – one must perceive some object and form the mental 
representation of that object as desirable in order for one to desire that object. Imagine, for 
example, a classic temptation case that involves a dieting agent who is struggling to avoid 
indulging in a slice of chocolate cake; the need for self-control in this situation arises not simply 
                                                 
5 The other four claims are: 
1. AGENTIVITY: efforts are things we do, not things that happens to us. We make efforts. 
2. TELEOLOGY: efforts are made with a certain intention, in order to reach some goal. We make efforts to φ. 
3. BIPOLARITY: «S makes an effort to φ» neither entails «φ» nor «non-φ». Our efforts can fail or succeed. 
4. EFFECTIVITY: qua actions, efforts however necessarily achieve a result. Something (be it mental) is actually 
done as a means to attain the goal. «Paul strives to seduce Julie by buying her expensive gifts» does not entails «Paul 
will seduce Julie», but does entail that «Paul buys her expensive gifts». What is done in an effort is distinct from 
what is aimed at. 
18 
from the presence of the cake, but from the agent perceiving the cake and mentally representing 
it as deliciously sweet and tantalizing. 
 If particular mental representations are essentially the cause of motivational opposition to 
one’s better judgments (i.e. mentally representing the cake as deliciously tempting while holding 
the judgment that one ought to be on a diet), then perhaps manipulating those mental 
representations (i.e. reappraisal) will also cause changes in the intensity of opposition that is 
presented to one’s judgments. In other words, changing one’s perspective about the object of 
temptation might modulate the force of that temptation. This modulation of perspective as a 
strategy of self-control has been observed in the delay of gratification experiments conducted by 
Walter Mischel (1970, 2004), which are designed to test an individual’s capacity to wait for a 
greater reward while being simultaneously tempted by a lesser reward. 
 The delay of gratification studies were conducted using children as the participants – the 
participants were placed in a room with a tasty treat (they were offered a choice between an Oreo 
cookie, a marshmallow, or a pretzel), then were told that the experimenter is leaving for a while 
and that the participants will receive two treats if they resist eating the first treat until the 
experimenter returns. The participants were allowed to eat the first treat at any point, even when 
the experimenter left the room, and successful self-control was marked by those participants who 
waited to indulge in the treat until the experimenter returned. Several conditions were tested for 
and the initial experiments suggest that “the presence of the rewards serves to increase the 
magnitude of the frustration effect and hence decreases delay of gratification by making the 
waiting period more difficult” (1970; 337). What the earlier studies show is that when the 
participants had their attention focused on the reward, it was harder for them to wait because 
having the temptation present escalated their frustration. Not focusing their attention on the 
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reward, on the other hand, allowed the participants to wait for the larger reward for longer 
periods of time. However, later experiments that tested for other conditions within delay of 
gratification (e.g. how the reward objects were presented) showed that the focus or diversion of 
attention is not what matters for delay of gratification. Mischel and Ayduk (2004) reach the 
conclusion that “delay of gratification depends not on whether or not attention is focused on the 
objects of desire, but rather on just how they are mentally represented” (114). They point out that 
successful delay of gratification was often due to the fact that the participants mentally 
represented the object of temptation (i.e. the treat) as dull and boring, whereas failed delay of 
gratification was typically the result of mentally representing the object of temptation as vivid 
and exciting. 
The successfully self-controlled participants are basically reappraising the object of their 
temptation; presumably, reappraising the object of temptation as something dull and boring, as 
opposed to vivid and exciting, attenuates the intensity of opposition created by that mental 
representation of the object and thus makes it easier (i.e. requiring less mental effort) to ignore or 
avoid it. Furthermore, the participants in these studies might have been reappraising non-
cognitively, that is, in the non-actional sense (i.e. passively unmotivated thoughts of the treats as 
dull and boring), but it is likely that many of them deliberately imagined, say, a marshmallow as 
a simple white square in order to achieve the goal of getting two marshmallows later. Cognitive 
reappraisal has thus been demonstrated as an effective and efficient strategy of self-control in 
classic temptation cases, and cognitive reappraisal can also work in the case of diminished 
motivation, but only if diminished motivation doesn’t involve a complete lack of motivation. By 
establishing an analogy between self-control and a muscle, as well as drawing on muscle fatigue 
studies, there is reason to believe that agents who experience diminished motivation might have 
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reserved cognitive resources at their disposal that can be utilized to engage a minimally taxing 
strategy of self-control such as reappraisal. 
 
4.2 Reserved Cognitive Resources in Agents with Diminished Motivation 
Connor is willing to concede that perhaps diminished motivation involves a motivational 
deficit, rather than a complete lack of motivation, but he does so only to make a further point, 
namely, that any efforts to be self-controlled in the case of diminished motivation will 
themselves be undermotivated. There is, however, evidence which suggests that diminished 
motivation might be a signal that cognitive resources are running out, but not that they are 
completely depleted. This evidence derives from the studies on muscle fatigue conducted by St 
Clair Gibson et al. (2001), who show that muscle fatigue signals a deficit in physical resources, 
but not a complete lack. Roy Baumeister (2002) argues that his ego depletion studies (i.e. studies 
that test the capacity to maintain self-control across different tasks, described below) establish 
that self-control is analogous to a muscle; if self-control is sufficiently analogous to a muscle, 
then it is likely that mental fatigue (diminished motivation being a form of mental fatigue) 
signals a deficit in cognitive resources, but not a complete lack. In this sense, agents with 
diminished motivation might have enough cognitive resources (reserved for potential future 
needs by feelings of mental fatigue) to motivate reappraisal, which in turn could attenuate the 
intensity of opposition and hence result in successful self-control.  
The ego depletion studies suggest an energy or strength model of self-control; according 
to Baumeister, “a strength model [of self-control] would predict that performance at self-control 
would grow worse during consecutive or continuous efforts, just as a muscle becomes tired” 
(2002; 131). The series of experiments conducted to test this hypothesis involve participants who 
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must perform two consecutive and seemingly unrelated tasks. The first set of experiments 
involves participants who “were randomly assigned to regulate their emotions (either amplifying 
or suppressing their emotions) or not to regulate them while watching a sad, distressing video 
clip” before moving on to the physical task of squeezing a handgrip for as long as they could. 
The participants who had been assigned to regulate their emotions, regardless of whether it was 
to amplify or suppress their emotions, gave up much sooner on the subsequent physical task than 
the participants who did not have to regulate their emotions. Another set of these experiments 
involved thought suppression, in that the participants had to list thoughts that they were having 
but some participants were instructed to suppress the thought of a white bear. After completing 
the lists, the participants moved on to attempting to solve unsolvable anagrams, and the 
participants who were instructed to suppress the thought of a white bear gave up much sooner on 
the anagram task than the participants who were instructed that they can think of whatever they 
want. A third set of experiments was directed towards temptation and impulse control, making 
hungry participants eat radishes in front of chocolates and cookies before making them solve 
geometric figure tracing puzzle. Again, what was found was that the participants who had to 
watch the cookies while eating radishes gave up much quicker on the tracing puzzle task than 
participants who were either allowed to eat the cookies or were not exposed to food. All of these 
experiments suggest that “a broad assortment of self-regulatory efforts draw upon a common 
resource and deplete it”, although, just like a muscle, consistent exercise of self-control allows 
this resource to become more resilient to depletion (2002; 132). Importantly, none of the 
subsequent tasks across the different variations of the studies required exceptional amounts of 
physical effort – squeezing handgrips, solving anagrams and tracing shapes do not demand 
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excessive amounts of physical resources – thus the resources that are being depleted by these 
tasks are specifically mental, or cognitive, resources. 
If self-control is indeed like a muscle, in the sense that it can get tired and grow stronger 
through habitual exercise, then some cases of diminished motivation could be understood as a 
type of mental fatigue that accompanies the over-exercising (and, arguably, the under-exercising) 
of self-control. Other cases of diminished motivation, where one’s self-control is not “tired out” 
from previous exercise, but rather occurs because one just simply doesn’t want to engage in 
some unpleasant task, can also be considered tiring in a certain sense, if tired is taken to mean a 
depletion of resources – individuals often remark that even the thought of engaging in some 
tedious task is tiring in itself, indicating that they perceive an insufficient amount of resources to 
engage in that task. On this analogy, desire is the kinetic energy that bursts life into the muscle 
when exertion is required, but the lack of desire-energy results in diminished motivation (i.e. 
fatigue) and, consequently, inactivity.  
The interesting thing about fatigue, however, is that it is not necessarily an accurate 
indicator of an actual depletion of resources, as pointed out by Tim Bayne and Neil Levy (2006). 
In their discussion of the phenomenology of effort, Bayne and Levy consider Baumeister’s 
analogy between self-control and a muscle in relation to studies on muscle fatigue conducted by 
St Clair Gibson et al. (2001). The muscle fatigue studies, Bayne and Levy explain, suggest that 
the degree of fatigue we experience is “teleoanticipative” – that is, 
it is influenced by unconscious representations of the amount of 
muscular effort that will be required in the near future, rather than 
merely being a response to the depletion of a physical resource… 
On this view the mechanisms causing the perception of fatigue are 
designed to preserve resources well above the critical level, and it 
seems natural to think of them as generating systematically 
misleading representations of our energy levels (2006; 19). 
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The mechanism that operates in this teleoanticipative way is a type of resource-
reservation mechanism, and it is possible, Bayne and Levy suggest, that a similar mechanism 
might be responsible for creating feelings of mental fatigue before an agent experiences actual 
depletion of mental resources. 
The resource-reservation mechanism that is engaged by physical effort seems to become 
active only given a certain condition: one must be exerting a substantive amount of physical 
effort, which indicates to this mechanism that perhaps too much resources are being utilized for 
some task and there might not be enough resources left for other potential needs. It seems, then, 
that the resource-reservation mechanism is activated only when a threshold has been reached – it 
would, after all, be imprudent to reserve one’s resources in cases when only a small amount of 
resources have been utilized. Imagine, for example, that every time an agent exerted a minimal 
amount of physical effort (by, say, brushing her teeth), she will experience a maximal amount of 
fatigue as a response. Such a sensitive resource-reservation mechanism would prevent this agent 
from performing low-effort tasks, even though such low-effort tasks might be ones that are good 
for the agent to perform (brushing one’s teeth, for example, is good for promoting one’s oral 
health). According to St Clair Gibson et al., this threshold is gauged by unconscious 
representations of the amount of effort potentially needed in the near future; this process 
balances present needs for resources with potential future needs of resources. Since it appears 
that physical effort and mental effort are sufficiently similar, unconscious representations are 
likely to also influence the experience of mental fatigue. In this sense, agents who experience 
diminished motivation are not necessarily experiencing a complete depletion of cognitive 
resources and might still have a small reserve of resources to utilize towards producing 
successful self-control through cognitive reappraisal. 
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4.3 How Ian’s Reappraisal Will Motivate Him to Paint the Shed Properly 
Thus far, it has been argued that it is plausible to utilize certain actional strategies of self-
control, such as cognitive reappraisal, even when one is experiencing diminished motivation. 
Connor, however, points out that even if it is plausible to initiate an actional strategy while one is 
experiencing diminished motivation, the resulting actions will still be under-motivated. Recall 
the example of Ian, who must paint the shed but feels minimal desire to do so – Connor predicts 
that even if Ian can convince himself to get off the couch, he will probably do a poor job at 
painting the shed.  
In order to illustrate how Ian can utilize cognitive reappraisal to remove motivational 
opposition and be sufficiently motivated to paint the shed properly, a distinction that was implied 
in the preceding arguments needs to be made explicit: the target for overcoming temptation is the 
object of temptation, whereas the target for overcoming diminished motivation is the better 
judgment. Self-control is required when an agent’s better judgments are opposed by something: 
the vivid and exciting mental representation of some object in temptation cases, and the lack of 
desire to do anything in diminished motivation cases; temptation is eliminated by eliminating the 
object of temptation (or, as was argued, the vivid and exciting mental representation of the object 
of temptation), but diminished motivation is eliminated by reigniting the motivation to act 
according to one’s better judgment. Given this distinction between the targets in these two cases, 
reappraisal works by essentially attenuating desire in temptation cases and increasing desire in 
diminished motivation cases. 
If Ian, who is experiencing diminished motivation to paint the shed, uses reappraisal to 
increase his desire to get up and paint the shed, presumably the “motivational opposition” in this 
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situation (i.e. Ian’s lack of desire) is removed and he would be more motivated to paint the shed. 
Moreover, since Ian will be generally more motivated to paint the shed, he will presumably be 
more motivated to paint the shed properly, given that he is no longer in the same state of under-
motivation.  
 There are at least two ways in which Ian can reappraise the thought of painting the shed 
in order to increase his desire to actually paint the shed. The first and, based on Mischel and 
Ayduk’s conclusion, most obvious way for Ian to increase his own motivation is just to 
reappraise the seemingly boring task of painting the shed as something more fun and exciting. 
Ian could, for example, imagine that painting the shed is a game, perhaps giving himself a time 
limit in which to complete the project in order to be “king of painting” or tell himself that sitting 
on the couch will be “unlocked” if he completes the project. Jane McGonigal is a video game 
developer who has researched the benefit of games for over a decade and argues that games fuel 
motivation in a way that regular life does not. McGonigal (2011) discusses certain studies in 
positive psychology that are relevant to understanding the almost limitless motivation for playing 
games – she references Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1975), who identifies a particular form of 
happiness that he has dubbed “flow”, which refers to “the satisfying, exhilarating feeling of 
creative accomplishment and heightened functioning” (xiii). Essentially, it seems that a state of 
flow is the opposite of a state of diminished motivation; the former is characterized by feelings 
of elation, presumably as a result of being productive (i.e. experiencing high levels of 
motivation), whereas the former is typically associated with feelings of depression or bleakness 
due to the lack of desire to engage in some task (i.e. experiencing low levels of motivation). 
Moreover, Csikszentmihalyi observed that flow more naturally accompanies games and game-
like activities, but seems to be harder to harness in everyday activities that are typically regarded 
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as tedious. Presumably, perceiving a tedious project, such as painting a shed, as more game-like 
rather than as simply chore-like will increase flow for the activity and thus increase Ian’s 
motivation for accomplishing his goal. 
 A speculative point about diminished motivation is that it often seems to accompany the 
perception of overwhelming daunting tasks. The reason why Ian could be feeling diminished 
motivation towards painting the shed is because he perceives that he will spend all day on this 
grueling and tedious task of painting an entire shed. If this perception is the source of Ian’s lack 
of desire to paint the shed, then another strategy that he can utilize to increase that desire is to 
reappraise the task as more manageable, as opposed to simply more exciting. Mele (2012) points 
out that there is evidence which suggests that vague goals are less likely to be accomplished that 
concrete, planned-out goals – a review by Peter Gollwitzer (1999) discusses the effects of having 
an “implementation intention”, which is essentially a plan of how, when and where one will 
achieve one’s goal (494). One study on implementation intentions found that 100% of 
participants who had a goal of administering a breast self-examination in the next month 
accomplished this goal “if they had been induced to form additional implementation intentions”, 
whereas only 53% of the control group, who were not induced to form additional implementation 
intentions, accomplished this goal (1999; 496). Similarly, another study focused on the goal to 
exercise for 20 minutes in the following week – only 29% of participants who aimed to exercise 
the following week but did not form corresponding implementation intentions successfully 
accomplished their goal, 39% of the participants successfully accomplished their goal when 
primed with all the health risks associated with lack of exercise; however, when the goal was 
accompanied by corresponding implementation intentions, the rate of goal accomplishment was 
significantly increased to 91% (1999; 496). The likely reason for why implementation intentions 
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have such a significant effect on goal accomplishment is that forming a “plan of attack” breaks 
down a vague and daunting goal into specific and concrete steps, which makes a goal seem less 
overwhelming and more manageable to achieve. In this sense, Ian can form an implementation 
intention to paint the shed at a certain time, perhaps even breaking the project down into smaller 
steps with their own specific time-line (e.g. paint one wall at 1:00pm, paint another wall at 
2:00pm, paint the roof tomorrow morning at 9:00am, etc.). Making such a plan might alleviate 
the daunting nature of Ian’s task and reignite his motivation to get up to paint the shed.  
 Which strategy Ian decides to use in order to increase his desire to paint the shed is 
irrelevant; the point is that Ian has options of how he can reappraise painting the shed in a way 
that can potentially boost his motivation. By having his motivation to pain the shed boosted, Ian 
will also presumably take more care in making sure that he does a proper job. In other words, 
reigniting his own motivation to paint the shed will likely make Ian more motivated to not only 
complete the project, but to do so properly and with minimal mistakes.  
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
Connor argues that non-actional views have the comparative advantage of explaining 
successful self-control in the case of diminished motivation because non-actional self-control 
(i.e. having the right sorts of thoughts) is not motivated (i.e. a causal consequence of a desire and 
belief that having these thoughts will result in self-control). I have argued that non-actional 
views do not possess the comparative advantage of explaining self-control in the case of 
diminished motivation. The non-actional view fails to provide an explanation of how an agent 
comes to have the right sorts of self-controlling thoughts, thus the non-actional view cannot rely 
on unmotivated thoughts as a likely cause of successful self-control. Actional views can 
prescribe the same strategy for producing successful self-control (i.e. having the right sorts of 
self-controlling thoughts), but actional views are capable of providing an explanation of how an 
agent comes to have these thoughts. Furthermore, having the right sorts of thoughts is a 
minimally taxing strategy, thus an agent with already diminished motivation can still utilize this 
strategy.  
I would like to make one more point regarding the vital role of desire within an instance 
of successful self-control. In rejecting Connor’s claim that successful self-control is likely to be 
non-actional, I have suggested some ways in which an agent who is experiencing diminished 
motivation can be successfully self-controlled in the actional sense, but in order to be able to 
utilize such strategies, the agent must have some motivation, albeit very minimal, to pursue her 
better judgment. One may raise the point that Connor’s ,original conception of diminished 
motivation involved cases where an agent might have absolutely no desire, and hence motivation 
to act on her better judgment, which does present a significant problem for any actional account 
of successful self-control in these cases.  
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While it is true that an agent who has absolutely no motivation to pursue her better 
judgment is likely to be incapable of engaging in any form of actional self-control, it is not 
obvious that such agents could actually exist. Connor points out that it would be begging the 
question for actional accounts to require that the agent is somewhat motivated in order to be able 
to engage in self-control. However, the actional view does not need to claim that an agent must 
perform a motivated action for that particular behavior to counts as an instance of self-control. 
Instead, a different point can be made – for a particular judgment about what is better to do to 
count as a sincere better judgment, the agent must have at least some desire to achieve the goal 
of that better judgment; if one didn’t want to be healthy, one wouldn’t believe that it would be 
better to eat healthy rather than to indulge in chocolate cake all the time. In this sense, every 
better judgment will entail some degree of motivation and thus the agent will be equipped with 
the minimal motivation needed to engage in minimally taxing actional strategies. 
Making this move denies the possibility of self-control in an instance where the agent has 
absolutely no motivation to pursue her better judgments. Importantly, this denial does not stem 
from the assumption that self-control requires motivation, but rather from the pretty 
uncontroversial observation that peoples’ sincere judgment about what is best entails some desire 
to achieve that best state of affairs.  
Identifying the nature of self-control is vital in understanding how self-control can be 
properly utilized in order for agents to achieve their goals. Self-control is important not only 
because it helps individuals promote their own physical wellbeing, but self-control helps to 
cultivate psychological wellbeing too. Being able to act on better judgments provides the 
satisfaction of achieving the benefits of our goals, but also makes us feel more powerful and in 
charge of our own happiness. Understanding that attempts at being self-controlled can be 
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successful in both temptation cases and diminished motivation cases will also make the prospect 
of being self-controlled less overwhelming and more attainable, which in itself is somewhat of a 
motivational boost. Most importantly, however, being able to explain exactly how self-control 
can be successful has a powerful prescriptive feature, where understanding the nature of self-
control also entails instructions on how one can be self-controlled in the face of any motivational 
opposition, whether that opposition is in the form of a temptation or in the form of deficient 
desire. Actional views of self-control, if they are successful at explaining how instances of self-
control are possible, can offer very useful instructions on how to achieve the goals of one’s better 
judgments. I have argued that non-actional views, on the other hand, seem to be missing this 
prescriptive feature. Explaining the conditions under which successful self-control is possible is 
important, but a well-rounded theory of self-control will also provide a practical guide of how 
individuals can actually be self-controlled, and thus contribute to the wellbeing of individuals 
who are seeking to learn how they can achieve their goals.  
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